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We examine the impact of corporate governance on firms’ innovation. We find that the presence 
of more anti-takeover provisions impedes firms’ innovation efforts, and thereby, is associated 
with lower levels of innovation. We also find that boards that have a majority of outside directors 
or female directors are positively and significantly associated with innovation. Our results show 
that firms with female CEOs or concentrated ownership structures tend to undertake smaller 
innovative projects and generate fewer patents, which could be the result of risk aversion. Finally, 
our results also show that the presence of anti-takeover provisions not only decreases innovative 
activities directly, but also impedes the efficiency of the monitoring by directors and strengthens 
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What causes firms to innovate? This is an interesting question and has attracted a fair amount of 
interest from researchers. In this thesis, we look at a specific aspect of this issue: the role of 
governance. Several researchers have addressed this issue. For example, Baranchuk, Kieschnick, 
and Moussawi (2014) analyze a sample of IPO firms and find that managers are better motivated 
to pursue innovation when they are protected by anti-takeover provisions. Hirshleifer, Low, and 
Teoh (2012) find that firms with overconfident CEOs obtain more patents and patent citations, 
and receive greater innovative success. Torchia, Calabro, and Huse (2011) use survey data on 
Norwegian firms and suggest that an increasing number of female directors make it possible to 
enhance the level of firm innovation. O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) examine the relation 
between control provisions and corporate innovation. However, each of these studies has 
examined in detail a limited aspect of the relation between corporate governance and innovation. 
In this thesis we adopt the opposite strategy – we consider a comprehensive sample of US firms 
and examine the relation between various facets of corporate governance and innovation for these 
firms.  
 
We find that the presence of more anti-takeover provisions is associated with lower levels of 
innovation. Our findings suggest that managers who are protected in this fashion tend to perform 
poorly, at least as measured in terms of innovation. We also find that boards that have a majority 
of outside directors or a large number of female directors are associated with more innovative 
firms. A possible explanation is that such boards are better able to monitor managers and thereby 
improve firm performance, including the firm’s ability to innovate. Additionally, our results 
show that firms with female CEOs (chief executive officers) neither generate many patents nor 
undertake relatively larger innovative projects. They appear to prefer smaller and safer projects. 
A possible explanation is that female CEOs are more risk averse and less confident (or less likely 
to be overconfident) than their male counterparts (Barber and Odean, 2001; Galasso and Simcoe, 
2011). Our results also indicate that a concentrated ownership structure is negatively and 
significantly related to innovation. This could also be the result of risk aversion, considering the 
fact that the blockholders holding a large undiversified position in the firm may not want the 
company to undertake risky projects. Finally, we also conclude that the presence of anti-takeover 
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provisions not only reduces innovative activities, but also impedes the efficiency of the 
monitoring by directors, and enhances the degree of risk aversion of blockholders. 
 
Our findings are related to and contribute to the following streams of literature. First: the earlier 
literature on innovation tended to use research and development (R&D) expenses as the variable 
of interest. This resulted in two problems. First, for innovation R&D refers to the expense akin to 
input but not to the output. It is interesting to know how the results are affected – recent research, 
such as Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014), Gao and Chou (2015), Hsu, Tian, and Xu 
(2014), etc., suggests the use of patent variables. Specifically, an examination of the patents 
earned by a firm has the potential to give us a better measure of the extent of innovation by a 
firm.  
 
Second: our thesis also contributes to the growing literature that examines the relation between 
innovation and governance. A number of more recent studies have analyzed the relationship 
between anti-takeover provisions and innovation in recent years (Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and 
Moussawi, 2014; O’Connor and Rafferty, 2012; Chemmanur and Tian, 2013). These provisions 
protect managers from takeovers and essentially impede shareholders’ ability to monitor the 
behaviors of the managers. Researchers have also questioned whether the presence of anti-
takeover provisions brings about a negative or positive effect on a firm’s innovative activities. 
Agency theory suggests that managers that are not adequately monitored by shareholders tend to 
waste funds on pet projects or engage in other activities which can destroy the firm’s value. Due 
to career concerns, the managers may also prefer to avoid riskier investments (Atanassov, 2013). 
This suggests that firms with more anti-takeover provisions will innovate less. 
  
An alternative perspective on the relation between anti-takeover provisions and innovation 
suggests that under certain conditions anti-takeover provisions could, in fact, result in greater 
innovation. The Managerial Myopia Hypothesis of Stein (1988) states that the threat of takeover 
could lead managers to focus on the short-term and less risky investments. This is because 
shareholders tend to pay more attention to short-term performance, as a result of asymmetric 
information. Alternatively, Manso (2011) states that greater pressure on innovators and a lower 
 3 
tolerance for mistakes could also bring about less innovation. Consequently, the presence of anti-
takeover provisions will encourage managers to undertake more and larger innovations. 
 
Prior literature has also explored the relationships between innovation and other types of 
corporate governance (CG), such as the characteristics of CEOs, the composition of the Board of 
Directors, and ownership structure (Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, 2014; Galasso and 
Simcoe, 2011; Pascual and Jordi, 2007). Because of the different functions and mechanisms, such 
as the strength of monitoring and the impact of being risk averse, CG could bring about a 
negative or positive effect on innovative activities. Using options and press-based proxies for 
CEO overconfidence, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) find that firms with overconfident 
CEOs invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and receive greater 
innovative success as a result of their R&D. Hung and Mondejar (2005) state that the fraction of 
outsiders and the number of shares owned by the Board of Directors are significantly positively 
related to innovative activities in firms. Additionally, the ownership structure of firms plays an 
important role in its general investment policy and its R&D expenses (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; 
Porter and Trifts, 2014). Pascual and Jordi (2007) find a negative relation between the number of 
blockholders and R&D investment. Minetti, Murro, and Paiella (2012) illustrate that ownership 
concentration, measured by the number of shares owned by the primary shareholders, negatively 
affects the probability of innovation. 
 
Although a large number of studies have investigated the relationship between innovation and 
CG, few have put many CG aspects together to explore their combined influence on innovative 
activities. Barring a few exceptions, most extant studies of innovation and governance focus on a 
very specific aspect of governance, usually based on a small and focused sample.1 In this paper, 
we fill that gap. More specifically, we analyze a relatively large sample of firms to examine the 
impact of an extensive set of CG measures on innovation; these include anti-takeover provisions, 
characteristics of CEOs, the composition of the Board of Directors, and the ownership structure. 
In a similar fashion, prior studies have largely focused on individual measures of innovation to 
study the effect of CG. In our thesis, we follow the recommendations of Hsu, Tian, and Xu 
                                                 
1 For example, O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) are one of the few researchers who focus on a more comprehensive 
sample. However, they focus on control provisions – one specific aspect of corporate governance, and R&D – one 
specific aspect of innovation.  
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(2014) and Gao and Chou (2015) and consider several measures of innovation that capture the 
quantity, quality, and efficiency of innovation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the development of the 
six hypotheses. Section III describes the data used in this study. In this section, we also introduce 
the variables and the methodology. Section IV illustrates the results for the basic statistics, 
univariate, multivariate, and interaction tests. Section V concludes. 
II. Prior research and hypotheses 
In this section, we review the literature and provide our innovation and CG hypotheses. For each 
effect of CG on firms’ innovation efforts, we provide some prior evidence and introduce the 
specific hypotheses.  
2.1 Innovation and anti-takeover provisions 
Innovation is likely to bring about benefits in the long term, rather than the short term. If 
managers are not protected by anti-takeover provisions, one possibility is that they will be 
swayed by the possibility of a takeover in the short term with the associated negative effects on 
their career. As a result, they may prefer to focus on projects that bring about short-term benefits, 
rather than participate in innovative activities. Under these conditions, the presence of anti-
takeover provisions has a positive influence on innovation. Their protection provides managers 
with the opportunity to make long-term riskier investments without concerns over acquisition 
attempts driven by short-term mispricing. This is the prediction of the Managerial Myopia 
Hypothesis (Stein, 1988). Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2013) indicate that strong 
shareholder protection, measured by laws (e.g., the anti-self-dealing index), leads to higher long-
run rates of R&D investment. Chemmanur and Tian (2013) and Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and 
Moussawi (2014) state that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation when they are 
protected by anti-takeover provisions.  
The view is not universal. As the “Quiet Life Hypothesis” predicts, managers could use the 
protection provided by anti-takeover provisions to reduce their managerial efforts, especially in 
terms of risky projects (e.g., long-term innovation efforts) (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). 
O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) suggest that provisions protecting managers will increase agency 
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costs, which brings about a negative influence on innovative activities. Consequently, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: Anti-takeover provisions are related to innovative activities. 
We test our hypotheses using the following specification: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Anti − takeover provisionst + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet +
β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                    (1)  
 
In the above model (1), the dependent variable is innovation, and we employ eight proxies for 
innovative quantity, quality, and efficiency.2 We describe these dependent variables in detail in 
Data and Methodology section below. The independent variable of interest is anti-takeover 
provisions that are measured by E-index, Ati-index, and G-index. The higher the index is, the 
better protection managers receive. See Appendix I for a description of all dependent and 
independent variables for this as well as subsequent hypotheses. 
2.2 Innovation and female CEOs 
In this investigation, we focus on the effect of a CEO’s gender on innovation. Barber and Odean 
(2001) state that males are more overconfident than females. Danes and Olson (2003) believe that 
the entrepreneurial role is more often associated with men than women. Innovative projects are 
risky. Hence, if a project is not successful, the CEO may be regarded as a low talent manager and 
can be fired by the Board of Directors. Overconfident CEOs prefer to take more risks and 
generate more innovation than non-overconfident CEOs on the ground that they underestimate 
the probability of a failure (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011). Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) find 
that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher R&D expenditures, obtain more patents and 
patent citations, and finally receive greater innovative success. Torchia, Calabro, and Huse 
(2011) indicate that a CEO’s gender influences the organization’s innovations. Consequently, a 
male CEO contributes to a proxy for overconfidence, and thereby, may bring about an effect on 
innovation. Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
                                                 
2 These proxies are defined in Appendix I. We use these as our standard measures of the dependent variable 
throughout this study. 
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H2: Female CEOs will bring about a negative effect on innovation. 
 
We test our hypothesis using the following equation: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ CEO_femalet + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗
Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                                                     (2)  
 
As in model (1), the dependent variable is innovation. The independent variable of interest is 
CEO_female, a variable taking on a value of one if CEO is female in a firm, otherwise zero.  
2.3 Innovation and CEO/chairman duality 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that the combination of the positions of chair and CEO 
maximizes shareholder interests. In addition, it prevents internal competition among senior 
executives and improves efficiency in decision-making. Hung and Mondejar (2005) empirically 
confirm that CEO/chairman duality is positively related to the development of new initiatives of 
firms.  
 
Based on the research of Mallette and Fowler (1992), however, it is determined that the Board of 
Directors tends to be more independent and more efficient in monitoring management under the 
condition that the CEO and chairman are different people. If a person holds both positions (i.e., 
CEO and chairman of the Board of Directors), he or she may have the power to choose projects 
that are consistent with his or her own benefits. Consequently, they generate less innovation. As 
such, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: CEO/chairman duality is related to innovation. 
 
We test our hypotheses using the following model: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ CEO/chairman dualityt + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗
MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                             (3)  
 
In the above model (3), the dependent variable is innovation, and we employ our usual eight 
proxies for innovative quantity, quality, and efficiency. Our variable of interest is the indicator 
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variable CEO/chairman duality, a variable taking on a value of one if the positions of CEO and 
chair of board are held by the same person, otherwise zero.  
2.4 Innovation and female directors 
We make distinction between our earlier discussion on the gender of the CEO and the gender 
composition of the board of directors. While decision making of CEOs could be affected by their 
risk aversion, the working of a group such as the board of directors may not necessarily have as 
clear a link personal risk aversion of its constituents and its decision making. On the other hand, 
Jurkus, Park, and Woodard (2011) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that a greater percentage 
of female directors may reduce agency costs on the ground that female directors tend to pay more 
attention to monitoring managers. O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) state that the executive may 
reduce innovative activities when agency problems are severe. Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009) 
draw the conclusion that gender diversification on the Board of Directors contributes to a more 
effective CG and firm value. Torchia, Calabro, and Huse (2011) suggest that an increasing 
number of female directors make it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation. Therefore, 
we conjecture that a greater percentage of female directors induces more innovations. 
 
Nevertheless, extending the logic we applied to risk aversion of CEOs, it is possible that boards 
where female directors are an overwhelming majority will begin to exhibit similar risk aversion. 
As a result, such boards may, in a similar fashion, reduce innovation in the firm. In order to 
maintain stable performance for firms, female directors may push managers to undertake more 
routine and less risky projects, which could decrease innovative activities. Therefore, a large 
number of female directors on a Board of Directors may damage firm innovation efforts. 
Accordingly, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: The presence of more female directors will affect the extent on innovation.  
We test our hypotheses using the following specification: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ NumFemale + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗
Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                                                   (4)  
 
In the above model (4), the dependent variable is innovation, and we employ eight proxies for 
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innovative quantity, quality, and efficiency. Our variable of interest is the indicator variable 
NumFemale, which is the number of female directors in a board.  
2.5 Innovation and the Board of Directors 
Continuing with our discussion of the board of directors, a board with more independent directors 
contributes to the monitoring of managers’ behavior, reducing the agency cost, and making 
managers select projects in the interest of shareholders (Byrid and Hickman, 1992; Peng, 2004).  
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) show that larger boards are likely to provide the resources and 
expertise to perform more and better monitoring that are demanded by the regulators or the 
general public. Additionally, a larger Board of Directors size, or more independent directors, also 
allows firms to easily access a larger pool of external resources, including technological and 
financial resources, which are important for innovation (Shapiro, Tang, Wang, and Zhang, 2013, 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
 
However, Jensen (1993) argues that boards with more than about seven to eight directors are 
unlikely to be effective on the ground that large boards lead to less effective communication and 
decision-making. Empirical findings by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 
(1998), and Mak and Kusnadi (2005) support Jensen’s hypothesis and find that larger boards are 
associated with lower firm value. Consequently, we hypothesize: 
 
H5a: The number of independent directors on the Board of Directors is positively related to 
innovation activities.3 
H5b: The Board of Directors size is associated with innovation activities. 
 
We test our hypothesis 5a using the following one: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ NumOutsidert + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt +
β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                                         (5)  
 
                                                 
3 We also study the effect of the percent of outsiders on innovation. We hypothesize that the percent of outsiders on 
the Board of Directors is positively associated with innovation activities. Our findings are qualitatively unchanged in 
this alternate specification.  
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We also test our hypothesis 5b using the following model: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Board sizet + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗
Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                                                  (6)  
 
In the above models, the dependent variable is innovation, and we employ our usual eight proxies 
for innovative quantity, quality, and efficiency. Our variables of interest are NumOutsider and 
Board size. NumOutsider is the number of independent directors in a board and Board size is the 
total amount of directors in a board.  
 
2.6 Innovation and ownership structure 
Prior literature shows that large shareholders often have an important influence on corporate 
strategy. These large shareholders, or blockholders, are defined as having 5% or more of the 
firm’s equity (Atanassov, 2013; Driver and Coelho, 2012). Hence, it is important to study the 
relationship between innovation and blockholders. Pascual and Jordi (2007) argue that a large 
number of blockholders could weaken the degree of monitoring of management, which increases 
managerial discretion and agency costs.4 As a result, managers prefer to waste money for their 
own benefits, rather than invest funds on R&D or receive patents for shareholder interests. Sapra 
and Subramanian (2014) conclude that monitoring intensity is significantly positively related to 
innovation. They determine this by using the number of institutional blockholders and the total 
percentage of shares owned by blockholders as proxies for monitoring intensity.  
 
On the contrary, Morck and Yeung (2003) illustrate that ownership concentration will reduce 
diversification, which depresses the manager’s incentive to innovate. Additionally, a high 
concentration of ownership is an undiversified position, such that the largest blockholder 
becomes more risk averse and tends to innovate less with their increasing number of shares. 
Large and undiversified shareholders may distort a firm’s investments because of their risk averse 
behavior (Bolton and Thadden, 1998). As a result, we hypothesize: 
 
                                                 
4 Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) argue that under certain conditions, blockholders 
could exert their influence by the threat of exit rather than activism. However, in our case the variable of interest is 
innovation and not market value. As such, our perspective aligns more closely with a situation where long-term large 
blockholders exert direct influence on management to focus on innovation.  
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H6a: The number of blockholders is negatively related to innovation. 
H6b: The number of shares owned by all blockholders is negatively related to innovation. 
H6c: The number of shares owned by the largest blockholder is negatively related to innovation. 
 
We test our hypotheses using the following one: 
Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Ownership structuret + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗
MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε                                                                                         (7)  
 
In the above model (7), the dependent variable is innovation, and we employ usual eight proxies 
for innovative quantity, quality, and efficiency. Our variables of interest are NumBlks, SumBlks, 
and Largest_B, which are expressed by the variable Ownership structure in the model above. 
NumBlks is the number of blockholders in a firm. SumBlks is the amount of shares held by all 
blockholders in a firm. Largest_B is the amount of shares owned by the largest blockholder in a 
firm. 
III. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
Our patent dataset includes data over the period of 1990-2003. Our data is from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The database contains detailed information on all of the 
patents awarded by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1976 and 2006 
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Patents are only included in the NBER if they are granted. 
There is a two-year lag between patent applications and patent grants. The latest year in the 
NBER database is 2006. Hence, we may not find the patents applied for in 2004 and 2005. As 
suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), we choose 2003 as the last year to address 
potential time truncation issues. In the meanwhile, we choose 1990 as the first data year to 
analyze, since the governance data is only available starting in 1990. Our control variables 
dataset comes from Compustat, our CEO dataset from Execucomp, our information on boards 
and anti-takeover provisions from Riskmetrics, and our data on blockholders are obtained from 
the dataset provided by Dlugosz, Fahlencrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006).  
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There are 22,668 patent observations from the NBER during the period of 1990-2003. Of these, 
22,628 observations are available on Compustat. The number of observations that are missing is 
40. The reason of loss is that the firm applying for a patent in that year may have disappeared in 
the same year, because of bankruptcy, restructuring, or an acquisition. Therefore, we are not able 
to locate these firms on Compustat. In addition, we regard that firms which are not found in the 
NBER do not own any patent and that patent counts for that kind of firms equals to zero. As a 
result, we get 123,049 patent observations for the companies with or without patents. 
 
For the anti-takeover provisions variables, there are 10,279 observations from Riskmetrics; the 
data covers the period of 1990-2003. Of these, 9,611 observations are available on Compustat. 
The number of observations lost is 668. For the CEO variables, there are 20,466 observations 
obtained from the Execucomp of Compustat; the data covers the period of 1992-2003. Of these, 
20,457 observations are available on Compustat. The number of observations lost is 9. For the 
director variables, there are 13,222 observations obtained from Riskmetrics; the data covers the 
period of 1996-2003. Of these, 12,897 observations are available on Compustat. The number of 
observations lost is 325. For the blockholder variables, there are 7,649 observations; the data 
covers the period of 1996-2001. Of these, 7,433 observations are available on Compustat. The 
number of observations lost is 216. All of the missing observations mentioned above are results 
of an acquisition, restructuring, or bankruptcy. 
 
Furthermore, we delete the observations if firm assets, leverage, R&D expenditures, or common 
shares outstanding is less than zero. We obtain 120,441 observations on the patent section, 8,995 
observations on the anti-takeover provisions section, 19,642 observations on the CEO section, 
12,306 observations on the director section, and 7,177 observations on the blockholder section. 
Since we lag all independent variables by one year in all of the regressions, we lose one year for 
each CG data observation. In the regressions, therefore, we analyze 8,553 observations for the 
anti-takeover provisions, 17,209 observations for the CEO, 10,210 observations for the director, 
and 6,705 observations for the blockholders. 
 
3.2 Variables and methodology 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
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We construct eight innovation measures. The first innovation measure is the number of patents. 
This variable is widely used in the previous literature to measure innovation performance 
(Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012; Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, 2014).  
 
Since patent innovations change widely in their economic and technological importance, 
however, patent counts cannot measure the success of innovation perfectly (Griliches, Pakes, and 
Hall, 1987). Hence, we use patent citations, which is the number of forward patents citing the 
patent, as the second measure. Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013) and Hsu, Tian, and Xu 
(2014) argue that patent citations could account for the quality and influence of patent 
innovations. In addition, since the patents created near the ending year of the sample have not 
enough time to accumulate citations, the number of patent citations is subject to the truncation 
bias, following Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014) and Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012). Therefore, each 
patent citation is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 
2005), which is obtained directly from the NBER5. We utilize the adjusted citation as the third 
innovation measure.  
 
Based on Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014), patent originality and generality could account for the 
fundamental importance of the innovation being patented. The wider array of technology classes 
of patents that a patent cites, the greater originality the patent has. Likewise, the wider the range 
of technology covered by patents that cite a patent, the greater the generality the patent has. 
Therefore, we also use originality and generality as innovation measures. Amore, Schneider, and 
Zaldokas (2013) state that the NBER patent database includes 400 main (three-digit) technology 
classes, as defined by the USPTO. As a result, we use the originality and generality indexes 
calculated by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) as two complementary innovation measures. 
Another innovation measure used widely in the literature is R&D expenses. 
 
In order to study risk aversion of CEOs, therefore, we use citation counts scaled by patent counts 
to measure the degree of risk-taking. In addition, Gao and Chou (2015) evaluate innovative 
                                                 
5 Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) estimates the total citations of any patent for which they observe a portion of its 
citation life simply by dividing the observed citations by the fraction of the population distribution that lies in the 
time interval for which citations are observed. In the case of patents for which they observe the prime citation years 
(roughly years 3–10 after the grant), this should give relatively accurate estimates of lifetime citations.  
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efficiency by the ability of a firm to create patents per dollar of R&D expense. We employ one 
measure of innovative efficiency as our dependent variable: patent counts scaled by R&D 
expenditures (Prd). To study the future effects of the CG on innovation, we lag all independent 
variables by one year to run the regressions (Gao and Chou, 2015). 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
The Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2001) governance index (G-index) is a proxy for anti-takeover 
provisions. However, recent research also questions whether all of the provisions in the G-index 
may affect firm performance. Hence, an increasing number of studies prefer to use the Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index (E-index) and the Cremers and Nair (2005) 
alternative anti-takeover index (Ati-index) as proxies. The E-index only contains six provisions: 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The Ati-index includes three 
provisions: staggered boards, poison pill, and restrictions on shareholder voting to call special 
meetings or act through written consent. To obtain a more robust understanding of the 
relationship between innovation and anti-takeover provisions, we utilize each index separately as 
an independent variable in our tests.  
 
We also explore the impact of CEO characteristics and the Board of Directors structure, including 
female CEO, CEO/chairman duality, the number of female directors, the number of independent 
directors, and the Board of Directors size, on firm innovation efforts. Additionally, to study the 
relationship between ownership structure and innovation, we employ three proxies for ownership 
concentration: the number of blockholders, shares owned by all blockholders, and shares held by 
the largest blockholder. A detailed explanation of the independent variables is provided in 
Appendix I. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Cohen and Klepper (1992) indicate that firm size and industry can bring about a significant effect 
on R&D intensity. Bhagat and Welch (1995) find that leverage ratio is significantly negatively 
correlated with current R&D expenditures for U.S. firms, and positively for Japanese firms. Hall 
(1989), Elliott (1971), and Giudici and Paleari (2000) regard debt financing as having a negative 
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effect on R&D investments. Atanassov (2013) and Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) 
use firm size and firm age as control variables. Except for the control variables above, Becker-
Blease (2011) also adds return on asset (ROA) and the ratio of the market value to the book value 
(MB ratio) into the regressions. 
 
Following prior literature, we also include commonly used firm characteristics as control 
variables: firm size, leverage, ROA, market to book value, and firm age. Additionally, we also 
control industry and year fixed effects in the regressions. A detailed summary of the variable 
definitions is provided in Appendix I. 
IV. Results 
4.1 Univariate test 
In the first test, we want to examine whether there exist some differences in the basic 
characteristics of firms which have a large number of patents and firms which do not generate too 
many patents. We divide firms into two samples, based on the patent counts: 1) firms generating 
patent counts equal to, or less than, three, and 2) firms owning more than three patent during a 
given year. We choose three patents as the boundary since the median of patents counts in the 
Univariate test is three. All firms studied in univariate test have at least one patent. 
 
Table 3 reports the mean of the firm characteristics across the two samples and tests for the 
significance of the differences between them. The firms with more patents differ significantly 
from the firms with less patents, in many aspects. More specifically, compared to firms with less 
patents, firms owning a large number of patents are larger, older, and more profitable. They also 
have a higher leverage, lower MB ratio, more independent directors, and larger Board of 
Directors size. In addition, we observe that firms with more patents tend to invest more in R&D. 
In the following section, we provide more detailed evidence on these preliminary trends 
4.2 Multivariate test 
In the multivariate test, we examine the effects of CG on innovation. All regressions employ 
White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. For each dependent variable, we do two 
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regressions: with and without control variables. In the regressions with control variables, we also 
control the year and industry fixed effects. 
4.2.1 Anti-takeover provisions 
In Table 5, we regress the E-index, Ati-index, and G-index separately on seven measures of 
innovation: patent, citation, ad_citation, originality, generality, R&D, and Prd. We also control 
for firm age, firm size, MB ratio, leverage, ROA, year, and industry.  
The results show the coefficient estimates for all of the indexes and five measures of innovation: 
patent, citation, ad_citation, originality, and generality, are statistically significant and negative at 
the 0.01 level and are economically meaningful. Thus, Panel A indicates that an increase in one 
unit in the E-index separately results in a reduction of 4.21 units in patent, a reduction of 39.37 
units in citation, a reduction of 27.93 units in ad_citation, a reduction of 1.23 units in originality, 
and a reduction of 1.25 units in general, after controlling for the other effects of firm 
characteristics.  
The impacts of the Ati-index and G-index on innovation are similar to the impacts of the E-index 
(Panels B and C). Furthermore, the E-index and G-index are negatively associated with the Prd, 
at a significant level, and Prd, which equals the patents per dollar of R&D expenses; this may 
measure the efficiency of innovation. No indexes are found to have a significant influence on 
R&D expenses. We conclude that the anti-takeover provisions of firms impede the innovative 
activities, reduce the innovative quality and efficiency. 
For the control variables, our results illustrate that larger firms have more patents and generate a 
higher quality innovation (Atanassov, 2013). Firm age is positively related to innovation, 
implying that older companies tend to innovate more, possibly as a result of their greater 
experience and potentially larger pool of available funds. Firms with a high leverage ratio tend to 
be involved in relatively higher innovative activities. We also find that profitability is positively 
and significantly related to innovation. 
4.2.2 CEO characteristics 
In Table 6, we regress the CEO_female variable on our seven measures of innovation and our 
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standard control variables. The results show that the coefficient estimates between the 
CEO_female variable and the six measures of innovation, except for Prd, are statistically 
significant and negative at the 0.01 level; and are economically meaningful. The presence of a 
female CEO results in a reduction of 6.82 units in patent, a reduction of 57.94 units in citation, a 
reduction of 58.71 units in ad_citation, a reduction of 2.6 units in originality, a reduction of 2.52 
units in generality, and a reduction of 0.21 units of R&D after controlling for the other effects of 
the firm characteristics. Overall, our results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. Hence, we conclude 
that female CEOs tend to invest less funds on innovative projects and innovate less than male 
CEOs 
Additionally, we regress the CEO/chairman duality on the seven measures of innovation with the 
control variables. We find that the CEO/chairman duality is positively and significantly related to 
four measures of innovation: patent, citation, originality, and generality. In this way, the presence 
of a CEO/chairman duality brings about an increase of 7.83 units in patent, an increase of 86.52 
units in citation, an increase of 3.03 units in originality, and an increase of 2.98 units in 
generality, after controlling for the other effects of the firm characteristics. Our results refer to the 
positions of when the CEO and chairman of the Board of Directors is the same person. This 
contributes to improving the efficiency in decision-making, maximizing the interest of 
shareholders, and innovating more patents that are of a higher quality. Panel B in Table 6 also 
shows that the presence of a CEO/chairman duality also reduce R&D intensity, without 
controlling for the other variables. The result indicates that CEOs under undiversified positions 
do not invest too much money in R&D expenditures. 
4.2.3 Director Characteristics 
In Table 7, we regress NumFemale on the seven measures of innovation with the control 
variables. Panel A illustrates the coefficient estimates between NumFemale and the five measures 
of innovation, including patents, citations, ad_citation, originality, and generality. These 
estimates are statistically positive and significant at the 0.01 level and are economically 
meaningful. From the results in Panel A, we find that an increase of one unit in NumFemale leads 
to an increase of 8.89 units in patent, an increase of 27.61 units in citation, an increase of 78.29 
units in ad_citation, an increase of 1.96 units in originality, and an increase of 1.94 units in 
generality, after controlling for the other effects of the firm characteristics. Nevertheless, 
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NumFemale is negatively and significantly related to Prd, a variable that measures the innovation 
efficiency. Overall, these results suggest that boards with more female directors are better able to 
foster innovation, which is contrary to the impact of female CEOs on innovation. One possible 
reason for this difference is that the CEO is an individual and therefore bears sole responsibility 
for executive decision-making. In contrast, the board of directors is a group and as such the 
impact of risk on their decision-making is not as clear as in the case of the CEO. The negative 
relation for innovation efficiency is puzzling. One possibility is that the relation between R&D 
expenditure and innovation is a nonlinear one and this drives increasingly higher R&D 
expenditure to achieve incremental innovation. However, a detailed analysis of this relationship 
is beyond the scope of our study.  
In addition, we separately regress NumOutsider and Board size on the seven measures of 
innovation with the control variables. The results show that the coefficient estimates between 
NumOutsider and the five measures of innovation, including patent, citation, ad_citation, 
originality, and generality, are statistically positive and significant at the 0.01 level and are 
economically meaningful.6 In the meanwhile, the effect of Board size on innovation is the same 
as those of the NumOutsider.  
Panel B illustrates that an increase of one unit in NumOutsider results in an increase of 4.40 units 
in patent, an increase of 21.33 units in citation, an increase of 34.78 units in ad_citation, an 
increase of 1.1 units in originality, and an increase of 1.05 units in generality, after controlling for 
the other effects of firm characteristics. Panel C indicates that, moreover, an increase of one unit 
in Board size results in an increase of 2.56 units in patent, an increase of 13.15 units in citation, 
an increase of 17.66 units in ad_citation, an increase of 0.75 units in originality, and an increase 
of 0.74 units in generality, after controlling for the other effects of firm characteristics.  
Overall, we conclude that a large number of outsiders, or directors in a Board of Directors, 
contribute to monitoring manager behaviors, reducing agency costs, accessing more resources, 
and generating more innovation. 
4.2.4 Ownership structure 
                                                 
6 The results also show that the coefficient estimates between the percent of outsiders and the six measures of 
innovation, including patent, citation, ad_citation, originality, generality, and Prd are statistically positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level and are economically meaningful. 
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In Table 8, we regress NumBlks on the seven measures of innovation with the control variables. 
We find that the relationship between NumBlks and the five measures of innovation: patent, 
citation, ad_citation, originality, and generality, are statistically negative and significant at the 
0.01 level. Panel A shows that an increase of one unit in NumBlks results in a reduction of 5.77 
units in patent, a reduction of 26.39 units in citation, a reduction of 43.15 units in ad_citation, a 
reduction of 1.48 units in originality, and a reduction of 1.44 units in generality, after controlling 
for the other effects of firm characteristics. Overall, these results indicate that an increasing 
number of blockholders in a firm may lead to a negative effect on firm innovation efforts, which 
provides some support for Hypothesis 6a.  
Furthermore, we separately regress SumBlks and Largest_B on those seven measures of 
innovation with control variables. The results show the coefficient estimates between SumBlks 
and the five measures of innovation (i.e., patent, citation, ad_citation, originality, and generality) 
are statistically negative and significant at the 0.01 level; they are also economically meaningful. 
The effects of the Largest_B on innovation are the same as the ones for SumBlks. Panel B 
illustrates that an increase of one unit in SumBlks results in a reduction of 0.45 units in patent, a 
reduction of 2.15 units in citation, a reduction of 3.17 units in ad_citation, a reduction of 0.12 
units in originality, and a reduction of 0.12 units in generality, after controlling for the other 
effects of firm characteristics.  
Panel C indicates that an increase of one unit in Largest_B results in a reduction of 0.62 units in 
patent, a reduction of 3.12 units in citation, a reduction of 4 units in ad_citation, a reduction of 
0.18 units in originality, and a reduction of 0.17 units in generality, after controlling for the other 
effects of firm characteristics. The results are consistent with Hypotheses 6b and 6c, indicating 
that a concentrated ownership structure impedes innovative activities as a result of a person being 
risk averse.  
4.2.5 Risk aversion 
Our results till this point indicate risk aversion as a possible reason for the link between CEOs, 
blockholders and innovation. Barber and Odean (2001) state that males are more overconfident 
than females. Galasso and Simcoe (2011) regard that overconfident CEOs prefer to take more 
 19 
risks on the ground that they underestimate the probability of a failure. Additionally, Morck and 
Yeung (2003) illustrate that ownership concentration will reduce diversification, which depresses 
the manager’s incentive to innovate. Bolton and Thadden (1998) indicate that large and 
undiversified shareholders may distort a firm’s investments because of their risk averse behavior. 
Hence, we predict that female CEOs and blockholders are more risk averse. We employ 
Citation_Pat to measure the degree of risk, since a patent receiving many citations is regarded as 
a larger, riskier, more valuable innovation, 
Our results are reported in Table 9. The results show the coefficient estimates between 
CEO_female and Citation_Pat are statistically negative and significant at the 0.01 level; they are 
also economically meaningful. It shows that the presence of female CEOs results in a reduction 
of 2.26 units in Citation_Pat after controlling for the other effects of firm characteristics. The 
result means that female CEOs tends to avoid undertaking riskier and larger projects as well as 
innovate patents with less citation counts. As such, our evidence is consistent with risk aversion 
driving the lower innovation levels by female CEOs. Columns 7-12 in Table 9 illustrate that 
NumBlks, SumBlks, and Largest_B are statistically and negatively associated with Citation_Pat 
at a significant level. This implies that blockholders prefer to avoid risky projects, and instead, 
choose a smaller scale of innovative projects because of them being a risk averse person. 
4.2.6 All corporate governance together 
We choose one or two variables from the four CG sections, separately, and use them as 
independent variables in one regression to study their combined effect. The choosing standard is 
that all selected independent variables (e.g., the E-index, the CEO_female variable, 
CEO/chairman duality, NumFemale, NumBlks, and Largest_B) are not significantly correlated 
with each other (Table 4). Table 10 shows that the effects of anti-takeover provisions, female 
directors, and a concentration of ownership on innovation are consistent with the results we 
obtained previously. The impacts of the CEO characteristics on innovative activities are 
weakened by other CGs. 
4.3 Interaction test 
To examine whether the presence of anti-takeover provisions weakens or strengthens the 
influence of other CG on innovation, we conduct an interaction test. According to the results of 
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the multivariate tests, the effects of the CEO/chairman duality, number of female directors, 
number of outsiders, and Board of Directors size on innovation are significant and positive. Table 
11 illustrates that their positive effects on innovation become weak at higher levels of anti-
takeover provisions.7 For example, Panel A shows that an increase of one unit in the E-index 
mitigates the positive impact of CEO/chairman duality on patent by 27.73%, on citation by 
28.22%, on originality by 25.58%, and on generality by 25.87%. Panel B illustrates that an 
increase of one unit in the E-index mitigates the positive impact of NumFemale on patent by 
24.45%, on citations by 22.46%, on ad_citation by 27.19%, on originality by 20.37%, and on 
generality by 20.19%. Based on the results, we conclude that the efficiency of monitoring 
managers from the Board of Directors is severely damaged by an augment of anti-takeover 
provisions.  
Furthermore, the results, reported in Table 11, also suggest that an increase in the E-index 
enhances the negative effects of SumBlks and NumBlks on innovation. Panel F, for example, 
shows that an increase of one unit in the E-index strengthens the negative effect of SumBlks on 
patent by 25.4%, on citation by 17.28%, on ad_citation by 28.93, on originality by 16.01%, and 
on generality by 15.1%. Consequently, we conclude that the blockholder preference of avoiding 
to investing in risky projects, as well as innovating less, is enhanced by the presence of anti-
takeover provisions. 
V. Conclusions 
While a large number of studies have investigated the relationship between innovation and CG 
(Hung and Mondejar, 2005, and Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, 2014), they did not 
explore the combined impact of many CGs on innovative activities. In this paper, we fill that gap 
in the literature. More specifically, we examine the combined impact of a comprehensive set of 
measures of CG on innovation, including anti-takeover provisions, characteristics of CEOs, the 
composition of the Board of Directors, and ownership structure. Furthermore, we use an 
exhaustive set of measures of innovation to test the effect of CG on innovation quantity, quality, 
and efficiency, following Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014) and Gao and Chou (2015). 
                                                 
7  Our results also indicate that the positive impact of the percent of outsiders on the Board of Directors is 
significantly weaken by the presence of more anti-takeover provisions. 
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We find that anti-takeover provisions are negatively related to innovation, possibly due to their 
raising agency costs. We also find that female CEOs tends to invest less on innovative projects 
and impede firm innovation efforts. Combining the roles of the CEO and chairman, tends to 
result in greater innovation. Our results also illustrate that the positive impacts of the number of 
female directors, number of outsiders, and Board size on innovation are weakened by an increase 
in anti-takeover provisions, which means the presence of anti-takeover provisions damages the 
efficiency of monitoring by the Board of Directors.  
Additionally, anti-takeover provisions could protect managers from the discipline exerted by the 
market for corporate control and managers who are protected in this fashion could misuse funds 
for their own benefits. Blockholders, under these conditions, would not want to provide too much 
discretion for managers, while innovative activities could give managers such discretionary 
funds. Therefore, blockholders could want less innovation with an increasing number of anti-
takeover provisions. We also conclude that female CEOs and large blockholders tend to reduce 
firms’ innovation efforts, possibly as a result of their risk aversion. Overall, our results provide a 
comprehensive perspective of the many ways in which corporate governance appears to affect the 
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions Function 
Dependent variables   
patent Number of patents applied for during the year. Quantity of innovation 
citation Number of citations summed across all patents applied 
for. 
Quality of innovation 
ad_citation Total number of citations summed across all patents 
applied for during the year. Each patent's number of 
citations is multiplied by the weighting index from 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). 
Quality of innovation 
  
  
originality It equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech 
class distribution of all patents it cites. Originality can 
be derived from NBER directly. 
Importance of innovation 
  
generality An array of technology classes of patents that the 
patents being cited. It equals to one minus H-index 
that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents 
that cites it. Generality can be derived from NBER 
directly. 
Importance of innovation 
  
  
Citation_Pat Citation counts received by per patent. Degree of risk-taking 
Prd Patent counts per a dollar of R&D expense. Efficiency of innovation 
R&D intensity R&D expenditures scaled by sale. Input of innovation 
Independent variables   
E-index Staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 




Ati-index Staggered boards, poison pill, and restrictions on 
shareholder voting to call special meetings or act 
through written consent. 
  
  
G-index Governance index following Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2001).  
  
CEO_female A variable that takes on a value of one if CEO is 
female, otherwise, takes on a value of zero.   
CEO/chairman  A variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO and 
chairman is the same person, otherwise, takes on a 
value of zero. 
  
    
NumFemale Number of female directors.   
NumOutsider  Number of independent directors.   
Board size Number of directors in the board.   
NUMBLKS Number of blockholders.   
SUMBLKS Shares held by all blockholders.   
Largest_B Shares held by the largest blockholder.   
Interaction     
Eindex_female E-index is multiplied by NumFemale.   




Eindex_outsider E-index is multiplied by NumOutsider.   
Eindex_cc E-index is multiplied by CEO/chairman duality.   
Eindex_NumBlks E-index is multiplied NumBlks.   
Eindex_SumBlks E-index is multiplied SumBlks.   
Control variables   
Firm size  Market value of equity plus total asset subtract 
common equity 
  
Leverage  Total debt divided by total asset   
ROA  Ratio of EBITDA to total asset   
MB ratio  Firm size subtract deferred taxes, then divided by 
total asset 
  
Firm age  Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has 







Appendix II: Tables 
Table 1: Data description 















Patent 1990-2003 123089 123049 40 
The reason of lose is that the firm applying a 
patent in that year was disappeared in the same 
year because of bankruptcy, restructuring, or 
acquisition. 
120441 
Director 1996-2003 13222 12897 325 Losing observations as a result of acquisition, 
restructuring, bankruptcy. 
12306 
            
Governance 1990-2003 10279 9611 668 Losing observations  as a result of acquisition, 
restructuring, bankruptcy. 
8995 
            
Blockholder 1996-2001 7649 7433 216 Losing observations  as a result of acquisition, 
restructuring, bankruptcy. 
7177 
            
Execucomp 1992-2003 20466 20457 9 
Losing observations  as a result of acquisition, 
restructuring, bankruptcy. 
19642 


























Table 2: Descriptive statistic 
 
Table 2 illustrates summary statistics. Patent is the total awarded patents applied for during a given  
year. Citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during a given year. 
Ad_citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each  
patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg  
(2001, 2005). Originality equals to one minus H-index which is three-digit tech class distribution of  
all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of  
all patents citing it. R&D intensity equals to research and development expenditure scaled by sale.  
CEO_female is a variable that takes on a value of one if CEO is female, otherwise, takes on a value  
of zero. CEO/chairman duality is a variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO and chairman is  
the same person, otherwise, takes on a value of zero. NumFemale equals to number of female directors.  
NumOutsider is the number of outsiders; Board size is the total number of directors. NumBlks is  
number of blockholders. SumBlks is shares owned by all blockholders. Largest_B is shares held by the  
largest blockholder. Firm age equals to logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in  
Compustat. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the ratio of operating income to  
total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Mb ratio equals to the ratio of market  









Dependent  variables         
Patent 1990-2003 120441 5.941764 0 
Citation 1990-2003 120441 41.7050174 0 
Ad_citation 1990-2003 120441 34.3919818 0 
Originality 1990-2003 120441 1.7239322 0 
Generality 1990-2003 120441 1.7587308 0 
R&D intensity 1990-2003 120441 0.8366302 0 
Independent  variables       
E-index 1990-2003 8995 2.0657 2 
Ati-index 1990-2003 8995 1.5675 2 
G-index 1990-2003 8995 9.0356 9 
CEO_female 1992-2003 19642 0.0108 0 
CEO/chairman 1992-2003 19642 0.5482 1 
NumFemale 1996-2003 10926 0.8407 1 
NumOutsider 1996-2003 12306 6.0488 6 
Board size 1996-2003 12306 9.6335 9 
NUMBLKS 1996-2001 7177 2.3421 2 
SUMBLKS 1996-2001 7177 23.5537 20.9 
Largest_B 1996-2001 7177 12.5147 10.13 
Control variables         
Firm age 1990-2003 120441 2.1905259 2.1972246 
Firm size 1990-2003 108278 4.6320049 0.2120983 
MB ratio 1990-2003 96285 2.6337112 1.3236784 
Leverage 1990-2003 120441 0.373093 0.3439962 




Table 3: Univariate test 
VARIABLE PATENT =<3 PATENT>3 DIFFERENCE P-VALUE 
Variable   name Mean (NOP) Mean (P) Mean (NOP)-Mean(P) P-value 
E-index 2.1129 2.1108 0.00215 0.9646 
Obs 1089 2148 
  
Ati -index 1.6327 1.7328 -0.1001 0.0097 
Obs 1089 2148 
  
G-index 9.0523 9.4693 -0.4169 <.0001 
Obs 1089 2148 
  
CEO_female 0.0146 0.00670 0.00786 0.0040 
Obs 2405 4479 
  
CEO/chairman 0.5385 0.6086 -0.0702 <.0001 
Obs 2405 4479 
  
NumFemale 0.6915 0.8724 -0.1809 <.0001 
Obs 1313 2657 
  
NumOutsider 5.7332 6.3253 -0.5921 <.0001 
Obs 1473 2991 
  
Board size 9.0964 9.4363 -0.3399 0.0002 
Obs 1473 2991 
  
NumBlks 2.4825 2.0954 0.3871 <.0001 
Obs 856 1855 
  
SumBlks 24.0775 20.0320 4.0455 <.0001 
Obs 856 1855 
  
Largest_B 12.3838 10.8715 1.5123 <.0001 
Obs 856 1855 
  
Firm age 2.3181 2.6497 -0.3316 <.0001 
Obs 10380 9640 
  
Firm size 3.6997 13.4415 -9.7417 <.0001 
Obs 9775 9209 
  
Leverage 0.2608 0.2701 -0.00934 0.0006 
Obs 10380 9640 
  
ROA -0.0109 0.0788 -0.0896 <.0001 
Obs 10336 9609 
  
MB 2.8837 2.7116 0.1721 0.0147 
Obs 9424 8546 
  
R&D intensity 3.3883 1.3477 2.0405 <.0001 
Obs 10380 9640 
  
Table 3 presents the comparison of the mean of independent variables and control variables between firms  
owning patents counts equals or less than three and firms having patent counts larger than three. All  
observations studied in table 3 own at least one patent during a given year, and all variables, except patent,  
are lagged by one year. The variables are defined as follows (see Appendix I for detailed definitions):  
CEO_female is a variable that takes on a value of one if CEO is female, otherwise, takes on a value of zero;  




otherwise, takes on a value of zero; NumFemale equals to number of female directors; NumOutsider is the  
number of outsiders; Board size is the total number of directors; NumBlks is number of blockholders; SumBlks 
is shares owned by all blockholders; Largest_B is shares held by the largest blockholder; firm age equals to  
logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in Compustat; firm size is the natural logarithm of total  
assets; ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets; leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Mb  






























          
Ati-index 0.7797 1 
         
G-index 0.7360 0.7183 1 
        
CEO_female -0.002 -0.0000 -0.015 1 
       
CEO/chairman 0.0872 0.0772 0.1258 -0.011 1 
      
NumFemale 0.1179 0.1101 0.2109 0.106 0.161 1 
     
NumOutsider 0.2535 0.2345 0.3370 -0.034 0.1581 0.491 1 
    
Board size 0.1239 0.1044 0.2297 -0.043 0.10145 0.488 0.7587 1 
   
NUMBLKS -0.057 -0.0713 -0.139 0.047 -0.08355 -0.220 -0.2788 -0.277 1 
  
SUMBLKS -0.198 -0.2250 -0.264 0.0586 -0.11496 -0.238 -0.365 -0.263 0.76409 1 
 
Largest_B -0.231 -0.2614 -0.262 0.0356 -0.11908 -0.168 -0.2972 -0.153 0.26112 0.78594 1 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation matrix of all independent variables. The variables are defined as follows (see Appendix I for detailed 
definitions): CEO_female is a variable that takes on a value of one if CEO is female, otherwise, takes on a value of zero; CEO/chairman duality is 
a variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise, takes on a value of zero; NumFemale equals to 
number of female directors; NumOutsider is the number of outsiders; Board size is the total number of directors; NumBlks is number of 
blockholders; SumBlks is shares owned by all blockholders; Largest_B is shares held by the largest blockholder. The values above are product 
moment correlation coefficient.
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Table 5: The impact of antitakeover provisions on innovation 
Panel A: E-index 
Variables 
(1)         
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
E-index -5.8727*** -4.2125*** -50.0238*** -39.3719*** -42.0328*** -27.9262*** -1.6527*** -1.2329*** -1.6353*** -1.2529*** -0.0068 0.0008 -0.0214* -0.036** 
 


















































































































































Constant 31.307*** -57.292*** 238.787*** -488.178*** 219.881*** -227.632** 8.8227*** -17.308*** 8.7853*** -17.250*** 0.13** 0.6977*** 0.4034*** 0.4721** 
 
(9.8947) (-4.7393) (8.1709) (-4.5907) (6.8765) (-2.0237) (10.0571) (-4.6013) (10.1368) (-4.5911) (2.0385) (2.6457) (9.319) (2.4392) 
R-Square 0.0047 0.1426 0.0042 0.0713 0.0025 0.1183 0.0043 0.1103 0.0043 0.111 0 0.0326 0.0007 0.0426 































Panel B: Ati-index 
Variables 
(1)        
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
Ati-index -4.0426*** -5.1916*** -45.1945*** -47.7268*** -20.1748* -33.505*** -1.2801*** -1.4763*** -1.2478*** -1.4491*** -0.0136 -0.0249 -0.0139 -0.0213 























































































































































Constant 25.527*** -57.317*** 206.446*** -489.102*** 164.754*** -228.5897** 7.4196*** -17.353*** 7.3674*** -17.340*** 0.1375 0.7202*** 0.3819*** 0.4467** 
 (7.9452) (-4.8989) (6.8354) (-4.7362) (5.9096) (-2.0436) (7.9936) (-4.7449) (8.0976) (-4.7334) (1.4515) (2.6375) (11.8561) (2.4912) 
R-Square 0.0014 0.1425 0.0021 0.0712 0.0004 0.1182 0.0016 0.1101 0.0015 0.1107 0 0.0326 0.0002 0.0414 








































Panel C: G-index 
Variables (1)       Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
G-index -1.068** -2.0015*** -13.1389*** -22.7663*** -7.5989** -9.4496* -0.3335*** -0.6917*** -0.3209*** -0.7006*** -0.0156 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0152* 























































































































































Constant 28.8531*** -54.271*** 254.4865*** -444.596*** 201.9033*** -222.0358** 8.43*** -16.023*** 8.3144*** -15.953*** 0.2572* 0.7125*** 0.3882*** 0.4868** 
 (6.0809) (-4.8674) (5.3777) (-4.6891) (4.5924) (-2.0945) (6.046) (-4.5714) (6.0495) (-4.5395) (1.9433) (2.6531) (4.7636) (2.5303) 
R-Square 0.0007 0.1424 0.0013 0.0721 0.0004 0.1178 0.0008 0.1109 0.0007 0.1116 0.0002 0.0326 0.0001 0.0422 































Table 5 reports the results for multivariate tests using various forms of Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Anti − Takeover provisionst + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε. The dependent 
variables include seven measures of innovation. Patent is the total awarded patents applied for during a given year. Citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during a given year. Ad_citation is 
total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Originality equals to one 
minus H-index which is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents that cites it. Those measures of innovation above are in 
year t+1 and R&D which is research and development expense scaled by sale is in year t. In addition, 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑡+1equals to 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅&𝐷𝑡, which evaluates innovative efficiency. The independent variables include three 
measures of takeover provisions: E-index, Anti-index, and G-index. Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in Compustat (Firm age), the natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the 
ratio of operating income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to book value (MB ratio). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The 







Table 6: The impact of CEO characteristic on innovation 
Panel A: CEO_female 
Variables 
(1)           
Patent 
(2)            
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)          
Prd 
CEO_female 25.3716 -6.8216*** -84.7816*** -57.9378** 518.7702* -58.7058** -1.5249 -2.5978*** -1.9412 -2.5213** -0.106*** -0.207*** -0.1303** -0.0147 























































































































































Constant 19.014*** -57.727*** 129.255*** -552.661*** 120.4032*** -121.2321* 5.54*** -19.985*** 5.4736*** -19.814*** 0.135*** 1.096*** 0.347*** 0.479*** 
 (21.2428) (-7.2266) (16.2626) (-7.3908) (15.9107) (-1.735) (20.2725) (-7.865) (20.402) (-7.9078) (5.1066) (3.734) (31.6046) (3.9732) 
R-Square 0.0004 0.1406 0.0001 0.0655 0.0024 0.1202 0 0.1101 0 0.1122 0 0.0334 0.0001 0.0389 































Panel B: CEO/chairman duality 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)          
Prd 
CEO/chairma 15.904*** 7.8322*** 99.7362*** 86.5197*** 86.0443*** 10.2745 4.5869*** 3.0314*** 4.4709*** 2.9801*** -0.1197** -0.0456 0.0162 0.0008 























































































































































Constant 10.603*** -59.057*** 74.085*** -567.072*** 78.6884*** -123.7932* 3.0264*** -20.500*** 3.0189*** -20.319*** 0.199*** 1.099*** 0.338*** 0.479*** 
 (14.1882) (-7.297) (12.3522) (-7.4414) (8.6375) (-1.7601) (13.826) (-7.9586) (13.412) (-8.0023) (4.1229) (3.6903) (31.4162) (3.9364) 
R-Square 0.0044 0.1415 0.0023 0.0669 0.0016 0.1202 0.0041 0.1115 0.0041 0.1136 0.0003 0.0334 0.0001 0.0389 































Table 6 reports the results for multivariate tests using various forms of Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ CEO characteristict + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε. The dependent variables 




of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Originality equals to one minus H-index 
which is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents that cites it. Those measures of innovation are in year t+1 and R&D 
which is research and development expense scaled by sale is in year t. In addition, 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑡+1equals to 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅&𝐷𝑡, which evaluates innovative efficiency. The independent variables include two measures of CEO 
characteristics: a variable that takes on a value of one if CEO is female, otherwise, takes on a value of zero (CEO_female), a variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise, takes on a 
value of zero (CEO/chairman duality). Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in Compustat (Firm age), the natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the ratio of operating income to 
total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to book value (MB ratio). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The statistical inferences are 



















Table 7: The impact of board structure on innovation 
Panel A: The number of female directors 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
NumFemale 14.1742*** 8.8945*** 28.9765*** 27.6061*** 149.4733*** 78.2867*** 2.3583*** 1.9626*** 2.2702*** 1.9433*** -0.1008** -0.0331 -0.0427** -0.051*** 























































































































































Constant 10.6109*** -59.9575*** 46.3064*** -228.988*** 87.0093*** -380.929*** 2.6445*** -12.9092*** 2.4234*** -11.8869*** 0.2219*** 0.6357*** 0.3481*** 0.5016*** 
 (7.4162) (-4.5575) (7.2231) (-3.6079) (5.7635) (-2.8748) (8.0529) (-3.8896) (8.3525) (-3.7903) (2.672) (3.0064) (11.0401) (2.812) 
R-Square 0.0082 0.1432 0.0017 0.066 0.008 0.1332 0.0041 0.1063 0.0044 0.1098 0.0004 0.0222 0.001 0.0325 































Panel B: The number of independent directors 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
NumOutsider 4.3308*** 4.4046*** 15.8137*** 21.3324*** 35.7797*** 34.7799*** 0.981*** 1.0965*** 0.9496*** 1.0511*** -0.0256** -0.0061 0.0047 0.0001 























































































































































Constant -3.2463 -71.256*** -1.302 -347.368*** -23.4446 -399.619*** -0.5985 -17.5851*** -0.6532 -16.6911*** 0.2797** 0.6414*** 0.3037*** 0.5427*** 
 (-1.1826) (-5.3433) (-0.081) (-4.2346) (-0.8188) (-3.1218) (-0.8868) (-4.8534) (-1.0231) (-4.8074) (2.5132) (2.8821) (7.8621) (3.0021) 
R-Square 0.0082 0.1457 0.003 0.0634 0.0057 0.1331 0.0062 0.1092 0.0065 0.1118 0.0004 0.0218 0.0001 0.0325 




































Panel C: Board size 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
Board size 2.6994*** 2.5623*** 10.0034*** 13.1485*** 18.8222*** 17.661*** 0.6902*** 0.7484*** 0.6837*** 0.7355*** -0.032*** -0.0109 -0.002 -0.0126 























































































































































Constant -3.3687 -76.8105*** -3.1711 -377.18*** 9.2349 -433.323*** -1.3886 -19.4044*** -1.5686* -18.5066*** 0.4365*** 0.6783*** 0.3489*** 0.5703*** 
 (-1.0019) (-6.0146) (-0.1597) (-4.8771) (0.2532) (-3.3942) (-1.5526) (-5.4936) (-1.8219) (-5.4344) (2.8556) (2.9057) (4.1249) (2.9553) 
R-Square 0.0039 0.1428 0.0015 0.0618 0.0019 0.1308 0.0038 0.1072 0.0041 0.1099 0.0007 0.0219 0 0.033 































Table 7 reports the results for interaction tests using various forms of Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ board structuret + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε. The dependent variables 
include seven measures of innovation. Patent is the total awarded patents applied for during a given year. Citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during a given year. Ad_citation is total number 
of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Originality equals to one minus H-index 
which is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents that cites it. Those measures of innovation are in year t+1 and R&D 
which is research and development expense scaled by sale is in year t. In addition, 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑡+1equals to 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅&𝐷𝑡, which evaluates innovative efficiency. The independent variables include number of female 
directors (NumFemale), number of independent directors (NumOutsider), and number of directors (Board size). Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in Compustat (Firm age), the 
natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the ratio of operating income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to book value (MB ratio). Additionally, all regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects. The statistical inferences are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 











Table 8: The impact of ownership structure on innovation 
Panel A: The number of blockholders 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
NumBlks -11.594*** -5.7706*** -52.127*** -26.3915*** -85.5738*** -43.1474*** -2.8914*** -1.4797*** -2.7831*** -1.4389*** -0.014 -0.0571 -0.005 -0.0021 























































































































































Constant 54.9063*** -59.299*** 249.7848*** -304.671*** 391.862*** -266.4538** 13.8711*** -14.83*** 13.2992*** -14.004*** 0.1361 1.6637 0.3462*** 0.5627*** 
 (11.1062) (-3.4553) (8.0609) (-2.89) (9.0321) (-1.9683) (10.5223) (-3.1669) (10.6059) (-3.1667) (1.4025) (1.3849) (21.757) (3.4565) 
R-Square 0.0144 0.1666 0.0072 0.0763 0.0107 0.1543 0.0124 0.1314 0.0128 0.1339 0 0.0367 0.0003 0.1239 































Panel B: Shares owned by all blockholders 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
SumBlks -1.0785*** -0.4515*** -4.8378*** -2.1502*** -7.8523*** -3.1675*** -0.2696*** -0.1207*** -0.2597*** -0.1188*** -0.0019 -0.0062 -0.0007 -0.0005 























































































































































Constant 53.0883*** -61.242*** 241.3544*** -308.819*** 375.9276*** -292.5313** 13.4325*** -15.058*** 12.8811*** -14.142*** 0.1478 1.7408 0.3511*** 0.5778*** 
 (11.7141) (-3.4267) (8.4588) (-2.8425) (9.5108) (-2.0466) (11.1025) (-3.1264) (11.1808) (-3.1143) (1.5077) (1.3909) (23.9353) (3.5162) 
R-Square 0.0151 0.1659 0.0074 0.076 0.0108 0.1535 0.013 0.1309 0.0135 0.1334 0.0001 0.0368 0.0006 0.124 




































Panel C: Shares owned by the largest blockholder 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)       
Prd 
(14)       
Prd 
Largest_B -1.3163*** -0.619*** -5.7768*** -3.1254*** -9.5392*** -4.0035*** -0.3316*** -0.1775*** -0.3173*** -0.1725*** -0.0025 -0.0062 -0.0005 -0.0001 























































































































































Constant 44.168*** -69.750*** 199.7635*** -344.598*** 310.4366*** -361.2888** 11.2345*** -17.012*** 10.7386*** -16.126*** 0.1339* 1.5617 0.3408*** 0.5561*** 
 (11.9446) (-3.8674) (8.6746) (-3.1104) (9.5916) (-2.5045) (11.4494) (-3.4959) (11.4875) (-3.4992) (1.9184) (1.4595) (26.2432) (3.4775) 
R-Square 0.0086 0.1654 0.0041 0.0759 0.0061 0.153 0.0076 0.1307 0.0077 0.1332 0.0001 0.0365 0.0001 0.1238 































Table 8 reports the results for interaction tests using various forms of Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Ownership structuret + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε. The dependent 
variables include seven measures of innovation. Patent is the total awarded patents applied for during a given year. Citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during a given year. Ad_citation is 
total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Originality equals to one 
minus H-index which is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents that cites it. Those measures of innovation are in year 
t+1 and R&D which is research and development expense scaled by sale is in year t. In addition, 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑡+1equals to 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅&𝐷𝑡, which evaluates innovative efficiency. The independent variables include number of 
blockholders (NumBlks), amount of shares held by all blockholders (SumBlks), and amount of shares held by the largest blockholder (Largest_B). Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has 
been in Compustat (Firm age), the natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the ratio of operating income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to book value (MB 
ratio). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The statistical inferences are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical 


































             CEO_female -4.4982*** -2.2596*** 
          
 
(-7.8479) (-3.0757) 
          CEO/chairman 
  
-2.472*** -0.2103 
        
   
(-8.5379) (-0.8253) 
        NumFemale 
    
-0.4049*** 0.0103 
      
     
(-5.3764) (0.1604) 
      NumBlks 
      
-0.2658*** -0.1471*** 
    
       
(-4.7021) (-2.9174) 
    SumBlks 
        
-0.026*** -0.0162*** 
  
         
(-4.9026) (-3.6007) 
  Largest_B 
          
-0.0221** -0.0185** 































































































































Constant 6.8364*** 5.8399*** 8.2265*** 5.8843*** 2.9097*** 6.0771* 4.338*** 5.0638*** 4.3019*** 5.1605*** 4.0038*** 4.8267*** 
 
(49.5178) (3.1002) (33.388) (3.1092) (26.3561) (1.8086) (26.2501) (3.0596) (27.5576) (3.1912) (28.1534) (3.035) 
R-Square 0.0014 0.3 0.013 0.2998 0.0075 0.327 0.0074 0.37 0.0076 0.3706 0.0019 0.3692 



























Table 9 reports the results for risk averse tests using Citation_Pat which equals to citation scaled by patent as dependent variable. The regression formula is Citation_Patt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Independent variablest + β2 ∗
firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε. The independent variables include a variable that takes on a value of one if CEO is female, otherwise, takes on a value of zero (CEO_female), a variable 
that takes on a value of one if the CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise, takes on a value of zero (CEO/chairman duality), number of female directors in a board (NumFemale), number of blockholders (NumBlks), 
amount of shares owned by all blockholders (SumBlks), and amount of shares owned by the largest blockholder (Largest_B). Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in Compustat (Firm 
age), the natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the ratio of operating income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to book value (MB ratio). Additionally, all 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The statistical inferences are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 






Table 10: The combined impact of corporate governance on innovation 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)            
Prd 
E-index -18.01*** -7.8305** -57.602*** -24.039*** -155.480*** -65.3643* -3.774*** -1.5042*** -3.5083*** -1.4042*** -0.0148* -0.0096 -0.0006 -0.0093 
 
(-3.9764) (-2.5169) (-3.8064) (-2.6813) (-3.3515) (-1.8699) (-4.0659) (-2.732) (-4.1172) (-2.7909) (-1.8207) (-1.1262) (-0.0507) (-0.7019) 
CEO_female 108.4644 -14.0458 130.4573 -66.036 1260.128 -187.7796 12.5646 -5.7436 10.2158 -5.9017 0.0213 -0.0799 -0.0626 0.0227 
 
(1.0985) (-1.0335) (0.9297) (-0.9992) (1.0403) (-1.4406) (0.9346) (-1.4227) (0.8959) (-1.5223) (1.2726) (-1.1041) (-0.7515) (0.3141) 
CEO/chair 10.219* 6.713 38.085* 31.255 43.0196 20.8402 2.6472** 1.9333 2.4215* 1.6975 -0.0511 -0.0532 0.0247 0.0039 
 
(1.8676) (1.3433) (1.7285) (1.425) (0.8263) (0.4435) (1.9623) (1.4772) (1.9144) (1.3718) (-1.4406) (-1.3382) (0.7954) (0.1311) 
NumFemale 18.337*** 10.7709** 32.8035* 29.9268* 165.949*** 83.2491** 2.9702*** 2.4248** 2.7982*** 2.3797** -0.0262** 0.0005 -0.0172 -0.0404* 
 
(3.4961) (2.368) (1.8888) (1.8718) (3.4011) (2.2161) (2.7774) (2.0934) (2.8902) (2.1444) (-2.3475) (0.0817) (-1.0463) (-1.8896) 
NUMBLKS -9.965*** -6.071*** -34.433*** -20.948*** -79.3396*** -45.817*** -2.2711*** -1.3994*** -2.1224*** -1.294*** 0.0003 -0.0061 -0.0181** -0.024*** 
 
(-5.0002) (-3.5693) (-4.1837) (-3.0758) (-4.5502) (-3.0341) (-4.6803) (-3.3523) (-4.6627) (-3.2784) (0.1565) (-1.2975) (-1.995) (-2.7141) 
Largest_B -1.429*** -0.9261*** -4.7477*** -3.178*** -11.0565*** -6.9797*** -0.3352*** -0.2264*** -0.3124*** -0.2112*** -0.001*** -0.0013** -0.0011 -0.0005 
 























































































































































Constant 85.471*** -15.9592 301.861*** -80.282 695.232*** -64.1812 19.772*** -0.997 18.466*** -0.1316 0.1537** 0.4779* 0.3617*** 0.9748*** 
 (5.1261) (-0.6029) (4.7586) (-0.6292) (4.2776) (-0.3608) (5.1096) (-0.1342) (5.1152) (-0.0186) (2.3701) (1.655) (7.4849) (6.8649) 
R-Square 0.0516 0.1862 0.029 0.1114 0.0472 0.1706 0.0407 0.1636 0.0409 0.1689 0.0044 0.0758 0.0066 0.1849 































Table 10 reports the results for interaction tests using various forms of Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ Independent variablest + β2 ∗ firm aget + β3 ∗ firm sizet + β4 ∗ MBt + β5 ∗ Leveraget + β6 ∗ ROAt + ε. The dependent 
variables include seven measures of innovation. Patent is the total awarded patents applied for during a given year. Citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during a given year. ad_citation is total 
number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Originality equals to one minus H-
index which is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents that cites it. Those measures of innovation are in year t+1 and 
R&D which is research and development expense scaled by sale is in year t. In addition, 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑡+1equals to 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅&𝐷𝑡, which evaluate innovative efficiency. The independent variables include a variable that takes 
on a value of one if CEO is female, otherwise, takes on a value of zero (CEO_female), a variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise, takes on a value of zero (CEO/chairman 
duality), number of female directors in a board (NumFemale), number of blockholders (NumBlks), and amount of shares owned by the largest blockholder (Largest_B). Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number 
of years a firm has been in Compustat (Firm age), the natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the ratio of operating income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to 
book value (MB ratio). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The statistical inferences are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * 






Table 11: The impact of interaction between antitakeover provisions and other corporate governance on innovation 
Panel A: interaction of CEO/chairman and E-index 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)         
Prd 
CEO/chairman 38.911*** 20.184*** 274.170*** 195.275*** 232.441*** 69.1714 11.041*** 6.7541*** 10.748*** 6.6136*** 0.0832 0.0828 0.0611 0.0963 
 
(5.0864) (3.3529) (4.2429) (3.25) (3.0957) (0.9957) (5.399) (4.0579) (5.4407) (4.0799) (0.4424) (0.3994) (0.8192) (0.9199) 
eindex_cc -11.197*** -5.598*** -83.2426*** -55.795*** -75.1171*** -27.0688 -3.0873*** -1.728*** -2.9966*** -1.711*** -0.0582 -0.0277 -0.0176 -0.0401 
 























































































































































Constant 14.333*** -84.680*** 81.8834*** -629.07*** 139.629*** -435.2637** 3.4063*** -23.44*** 3.3335*** -22.85*** 0.1507* 1.0179* 0.3207*** 0.6676*** 
 (8.0202) (-4.3627) (6.9243) (-3.8893) (4.9291) (-2.4142) (8.3797) (-4.1559) (8.302) (-4.1451) (1.8096) (1.8556) (18.1605) (2.9713) 
R-Square 0.0103 0.1497 0.008 0.073 0.0039 0.1262 0.0104 0.1166 0.0104 0.1173 0.0003 0.0375 0.0005 0.0443 




























































Panel B: interaction of NumFemale and E-index 
VARIABLES 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)         
Prd 
NumFemale 34.979*** 20.206*** 70.0601*** 43.9713** 421.283*** 248.715*** 5.3126*** 3.1406*** 5.0212*** 3.0691*** -0.0888 -0.0521 -0.0607* -0.0598** 
 
(3.9146) (3.3139) (2.8608) (2.3776) (3.8095) (3.3678) (3.4115) (2.6775) (3.558) (2.815) (-1.4147) (-1.1067) (-1.9366) (-2.1592) 
eindex_female -8.9631*** -4.9401*** -20.6189*** -9.8783* -106.414*** -67.6242*** -1.4487*** -0.6397** -1.3637*** -0.6197** 0 0.0157 0.0077 0.0029 
 























































































































































Constant 9.9897*** -65.255*** 36.5388*** -212.696** 90.6029*** -493.3806** 2.3508*** -12.83*** 2.1402*** -11.651** 0.1869* 0.5474* 0.332*** 0.4886** 
 (4.7165) (-3.1965) (5.4241) (-2.5621) (3.6035) (-2.2891) (5.3373) (-2.6487) (5.5088) (-2.5711) (1.6724) (1.8104) (7.5694) (2.0206) 
R-Square 0.0202 0.147 0.0066 0.0752 0.021 0.139 0.0103 0.1087 0.0108 0.113 0.0004 0.0098 0.0013 0.0379 





























































Panel C: interaction of NumOutsider and E-index 
VARIABLES 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)         
Prd 
NumOutsider 10.093*** 7.8095*** 24.3893*** 19.6716*** 110.646*** 90.193*** 1.7601*** 1.3142*** 1.6411*** 1.2208*** -0.0079 0.0171 0.0114* 0.0188 
 
(4.6963) (3.6083) (3.4197) (3.028) (4.2671) (3.1994) (4.2521) (3.2641) (4.3811) (3.2892) (-1.2256) (1.6142) (1.81) (1.2155) 
eindex_outsider -1.9933*** -1.229*** -5.2938*** -2.8523** -22.0623*** -15.5984*** -0.3532*** -0.1739** -0.3262*** -0.161*** -0.0046 -0.0027 -0.0019 -0.0055 
 























































































































































Constant -11.214** -78.554*** -18.3006 -245.99*** -122.7726* -640.7147** -1.713 -15.18*** -1.6607* -13.88*** 0.223 0.5302* 0.2594*** 0.5652** 
 (-2.0865) (-3.3992) (-0.9962) (-2.6841) (-1.8597) (-2.5711) (-1.6409) (-2.8187) (-1.7451) (-2.7562) (1.5875) (1.7937) (6.0106) (2.0715) 
R-Square 0.024 0.1513 0.0117 0.0778 0.0206 0.1427 0.0161 0.1115 0.0165 0.1156 0.0003 0.0098 0.0004 0.0382 





























































Panel D: interaction of Board size and E-index 
VARIABLES 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)         
Prd 
Board size 5.5195*** 3.7778*** 13.5023*** 9.6373** 55.5177*** 40.2544*** 1.0631*** 0.7724*** 1.0026*** 0.7258*** -0.0264 -0.0099 0.0028 -0.0024 
 
(4.9322) (3.3737) (3.9869) (2.5347) (4.017) (3.0814) (4.41) (3.0228) (4.4518) (3.2251) (-1.494) (-0.7554) (0.3359) (-0.2893) 
eindex_director -0.9692*** -0.4907*** -2.6414*** -1.0473** -10.5572*** -6.4884*** -0.1788*** -0.0669** -0.1658*** -0.0624** -0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0032 
 























































































































































Constant -10.4195* -82.340*** -18.285 -256.48*** -70.4959 -669.340*** -2.412* -16.38*** -2.3977** -15.02*** 0.4156 0.5874* 0.3002*** 0.5558** 
 (-1.8397) (-3.8262) (-1.0702) (-3.1132) (-0.9768) (-2.7611) (-1.9256) (-3.2628) (-2.0219) (-3.1939) (1.5596) (1.6734) (2.7134) (2.0524) 
R-Square 0.014 0.1454 0.0074 0.075 0.0108 0.1366 0.0111 0.1087 0.0115 0.1128 0.0008 0.0098 0.0002 0.0383 





























































Panel E: interaction of NumBlks and E-index 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)         
Prd 
NumBlks -9.9497*** -5.5155*** -31.2524*** -21.275*** -73.9363*** -39.9052*** -2.2816*** -1.495*** -2.1534*** -1.408*** 0.0094 0.0005 -0.0196* -0.0147 
 
(-4.1798) (-3.1289) (-3.2621) (-2.8517) (-3.5866) (-2.7346) (-4.0638) (-3.1802) (-4.1285) (-3.1305) (1.1669) (0.1137) (-1.8153) (-1.262) 
eindex_NumBlks -1.2172*** -0.5803* -4.7855*** -1.2328 -10.8791** -4.4818 -0.2713*** -0.0716 -0.2447*** -0.0581 -0.0029 -0.002 0.0008 -0.0023 
 























































































































































Constant 56.528*** -39.9726 184.818*** -146.1442 429.762*** -263.5069 12.946*** -6.6442 12.114*** -5.7014 0.045*** 0.3642** 0.341*** 0.5797** 
 (6.3638) (-1.5942) (5.1862) (-1.2574) (5.4959) (-1.4214) (6.2057) (-0.9907) (6.2442) (-0.8966) (5.983) (1.9821) (15.295) (2.477) 
R-Square 0.0175 0.1711 0.0129 0.1015 0.0132 0.1572 0.017 0.1495 0.0172 0.1542 0.0004 0.071 0.0047 0.1636 





























































Panel F: interaction of SumBlks and E-index 
Variables 
(1)       
Patent 
(2)       
Patent 
(3)       
Citation 
(4)       
Citation 
(5)       
ad_citation 
(6)       
ad_citation 
(7)       
Originality 
(8)       
Originality 
(9)       
Generality 
(10)       
Generality 
(11)            
R&D 
(12)            
R&D 
(13)          
Prd 
(14)         
Prd 
SumBlks -0.8693*** -0.3627*** -2.7143*** -1.4078*** -6.4437*** -2.4813*** -0.1996*** -0.102*** -0.1878*** -0.097*** 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0017* -0.0012 
 
(-5.0552) (-3.2694) (-3.8884) (-3.053) (-4.3524) (-2.7571) (-4.8934) (-3.3647) (-4.9452) (-3.3055) (0.5001) (-0.87) (-1.9538) (-1.2358) 
eindex_SumBlks -0.1774*** -0.0921*** -0.6424*** -0.2433** -1.4908*** -0.7178** -0.04*** -0.0164** -0.0367*** -0.0146** -0.0002 -0.0002 0 -0.0003 
 























































































































































Constant 55.81*** -43.1228 181.308*** -159.1348 422.887*** -292.3324 12.792*** -7.3206 11.965*** -6.3228 0.0538*** 0.383** 0.3394*** 0.5868** 
 (6.6628) (-1.615) (5.4651) (-1.2919) (5.6746) (-1.4556) (6.5409) (-1.0478) (6.5858) (-0.9609) (6.7523) (2.0714) (15.4715) (2.4594) 
R-Square 0.0187 0.17 0.0133 0.1006 0.0139 0.1564 0.0183 0.1484 0.0185 0.1531 0.0001 0.0711 0.0049 0.1632 































Table 11 reports the results for interaction tests using various forms of Innovationt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗ corporate governancet + β2 ∗ interactiont + β3 ∗ firm aget + β4 ∗ firm sizet + β5 ∗ MBt + β6 ∗ Leveraget + β7 ∗ ROAt + ε. 
The dependent variables include seven measures of innovation. Patent is the total awarded patents applied for during a given year. Citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during a given year. 
Ad_citation is total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. Each patent's number of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Originality 
equals to one minus H-index which is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents it cites. Generality equals to one minus H-index that is three-digit tech class distribution of all patents that cites it. Those measures of 
innovation are in year t+1 and R&D which is research and development expense scaled by sale is in year t. In addition, 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑡+1equals to 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅&𝐷𝑡, which evaluate innovative efficiency. Corporate governance 
variables include CEO/chairman duality, number of female directors, number of outsiders, Board size, number of blockholders, and amount of shares held by all blockholders. The interaction variables are following ones. 
Eindex_cc is E-index multiplied CEO/chairman duality. Eindex_female is E-index multiplied number of female directors. Eindex_outsider is E-index multiplied number of outsiders. Eindex_director is E-index multiplied number 
of directors.  Eindex_NumBlks is E-index multiplied number of blockholders. Eindex_SumBlks is E-index multiplied amount of shares held by all blockholders.  Control variables include Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years 
a firm has been in Compustat (Firm age), the natural logarithm of total assets (firm size), the ratio of operating income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of market value to book 
value (MB ratio). Additionally, all regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The statistical inferences are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
